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Between Rocks and Hard
Places? The Strategic Path of Jorda n in a
Changing Middle East
John C. Creed
College of Charleston

Jordan :Sdecision to closely associate itself with the US-led "war
on terror" can best be explained by examining aspects of the
country s political economy. The policy direction charted by King
Abdullah raises new dilemmas for the country in the wake of ongoing Israeli-Palestinian tensions and Americas campaign
against Iraq.

T

he events of September 11 have sharpened security concerns for many nations in the Arab world . Almost immediately after the attacks, observations by American
policymakers and commentators that the men suspected of hijacking four American aircraft were all from the Middle East,
most notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt, reinforced politically sensitive issues for these regimes and others about the levels and
consequences of domestic discontent brewing within their societies. While relatively small segments of Arab national populations support the specific methods and ideology of al-Qaeda and
Osama Bin Laden, the overall critique of prevailing regional
politics they espouse, including the prevalence of official corruption and its connections to persistent and widespread economic
and social degradation in the Arab world, retains a potential to
mobilize many. Moreover, the ongoing crises in IsraeliPalestinian relations, coupled with American threats to expand
its "war on terror" to Iraq and other Arab states heightened
anxieties about future regional stability and posed fundamental
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questions for the Arab world about ongoing relationships with
the US.
No Middle Eastern actor feels greater pressures in these arenas today than Jordan. Geographically pinched between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and America's ongoing campaign
against Iraq, Jordan is continually concerned for its physical and
military security in an uncertain regional environment. But domestically too, Jordan has long worried about its economic and
political future, particularly given its tenuous demographic balance between East Bank Transjordanians and majority Palestinian population. Even before the events of the past year, promises
by King Abdullah for greater economic prosperity and further
democratic reforms have sharply contrasted with the stagnant
levels of development and tighter domestic political restrictions
prevailing in the country. Jordan's immediate endorsement of the
US after the events of September 11 and its public efforts to influence US policy on regional conflicts while continuing to pursue economic help from the West contrasted notably with the
more ambiguous reactions of other Arab states and exacerbated
public concerns over the directions of Jordan 's future international relations. 1
In some important ways, Jordan's decision to align so
strongly with the US in its "war on terror" underscores the country's current vulnerabilities and stands in marked contrast to
choices it made during the Gulf War of 1990-91. A decade ago,
the Jordanian monarchy followed popular sentiment and shunned
the US position that eventually led to war with Iraq, calculating
that what it lost economically in regional and international aid
could be recouped politically through enhanced domestic popu1

Stephen Glain, "Amman Dispatch : Slide Rule," The New Republic 19 November 2001 ,
p. 20; Douglas Jehl, "Arab Allies Not Jumping to Join US Side," The New York Times 27
September 2001 , p. 3.
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larity (Anderson 1997). Over the past ten years, however, Jordan
has increasingly sought to portray itself as a forward-looking
Arab state, willing to embrace elements of a globalizing world
and make peace with Israel while it carefully pursues economic
and political reform at home. Given the direction it has embarked upon and its current reliance on the international community for support in managing its economic difficulties, Jordan is
today banking on enhanced attention and assistance in exchange
for its strong political stance against terror. This policy comes
with significant risks to the regime. As in developing countries
throughout the world, a segment of Jordan's population believes
the US and the processes of globalization it promotes serves to
threaten national, cultural, and religious identities in the region
or constitutes a form of neo-imperialism. When these perceptions
are combined with more widely prevailing public concerns over
persistent domestic hardships and sharp reminders of suffering
among neighboring Palestinians or Iraqis at the hand of American supported policies, pressures on the Jordanian state inevitably grow.
The security dilemmas now facing Jordan involve increasingly stark choices between domestic and foreign policy directions. On the one hand, for Jordan to adopt a foreign policy
favoring the West that ultimately entails confronting terror on
terms set by the West runs the risk of alienating significant portions of the domestic population, especially if any "war on terror" distorts or damages Jordan's brittle economy. The prospects
of growing gaps between public and governmental outlooks and
a rise in organized domestic efforts to express popular dissatisfaction with official policy courts the possibility of more repressive governmental responses, which in turn further
jeopardizes the Jordanian regime's efforts to credibly promote
political liberalization at home. A worst-case scenario could
see an undercutting of Jordan's domestic political stability. On
VOL. 30 2002
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the other hand, for Jordan's foreign policy to express popular
sentiments and thereby challenge core elements of western
stands on policy toward Iraq or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
will almost certainly jeopardize American and western support that the regime has sought to cultivate over the past decade, thereby endangering the state's capacity to meet
economic challenges and domestic needs. Traditional explanations for how states resolve such dilemmas that emphasize
decision-making based on the nature of external threats go
only so far in accounting for Jordan's recent foreign policy
behavior and competing perspectives that focus on domestic
factors primarily serve to underscore the dilemmas that prevail. Instead, increasingly, Jordan's foreign policy alignments
can be understood by examining aspects of the country's political economy. The nation's prevailing economic needs and
the ways these influence the decisions of Jordanian leaders
pose distinct challenges for the Kingdom. In several important
ways too, the dilemmas Jordan confronts are emblematic of
the hurdles facing many regimes in the Arab world. How successfully Jordan manages its affairs may provide telling indicators about its future, the future of the region and the
capacity of the US and the West to pursue its interests in the
area. After a brief summary of the actions Jordan has taken in
response to September 11 and the immediate concerns they
pose, the recent twists and turns of Jordan's strategic path will
be evaluated from external, domestic and political economy
perspectives.
JORDAN'S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11

At the time of the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington,
D.C ., and Pennsylvania, King Abdullah was in London preparing
for a weeklong trip to the US intended to culminate in talks with
TH E JO URNAL O F PO LITI CAL SCIE N CE
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President Bush. Although the King cancelled the visit, his government soon signaled its firm support for the US actions against
al-Qaeda, arguing that the attacks were carried out by "extremists who do not represent at all the Arabs and Muslims and serve
in no way their just causes." 2 As part of this initial response too,
King Abdullah became the first Arab leader to visit the White
House three weeks later and indicated that Jordan would continue sharing intelligence on terrorists with the US. 3 These reactions were accompanied by stories originating in Europe and
reprinted in Jordan that the King and his family had themselves
been targeted by al-Qaeda for assassination in the summer 2000,
thereby seeming to establish some tangible connection between
Jordan and America's plight. 4
Nonetheless, when the US initiated military action against the
Taliban some weeks later, Jordanian society reacted in near complete opposition. While Islamic critics of the Jordanian government condemned American attacks on Afghanistan as a "dirty
war of extermination" and opposition political parties were prohibited by the government from organizing marches to protest
US aggression, many Jordanian philanthropic groups set up
committees in solidarity with Afghanistan. 5 However, official
Jordanian responses to American actions were notably more
muted, emphasizing only that the US should take care to spare
Afghan civilians while warning constituencies within Jordan that
the regime would take "all necessary measures to maintain na2

"Jordan Backs International Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan Times 9
October 200 I .
3
Sana Kamal, "Taking No Chances ," Middle East International 12 October 2001, p. 11.
4
See "Bin Laden Wanted to Kill Jordan's Royal Family," The Jordan Times 8 October
2001.
5
"Jordan Backs International Anti-Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan
Times 9 October 200 I; CGonomist Intelligence Unit (EnJ), Country Report Jordan, December 2001, p . 13.
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tional security for the interests of the country." Soon after, Jordanian security forces detained a number of Islamists and Jordan's Penal Code was revised without parliamentary approval to
broadly redefine terrorism and mandate that violations would
7
result in death or life imprisonment. These changes were accompanied by multiple security trials in the country that took on
new domestic and international significance, particularly the case
of Raed Hijazi, who had been on the FBI's most wanted list and
stood accused of planning to bomb the Radisson SAS hotel in
Amman as part of a series of al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on
American and Israeli targets during millennium celebrations in
Jordan. 8 At the conclusion of a brief but controversial set of proceedings, a Jordanian judge found Hijazi guilty of planning the
attack and sentenced him to death, while at the same time acquitting him of having belonged to al-Qaeda. 9 Ramifications of this
trial persisted beyond Hijazi 's sentencing as a February 2002
bomb blast in Amman was thought to have targeted one of Jordan's top investigators in the case.' 0 By the end of 2001, King
Abdullah had approved another controversial temporary law
permitting Jordanian troop deployments to Afghanistan for a
"humanitarian mission" involving medical and mine clearing
11
operations in Mazar-e Sharif. Moreover, added restrictions imposed on Jordan's media and press increased the risks of criticiz6

"Jordan Backs International Terrorist Efforts, Warns on Security," The Jordan Times 9
October 200 I .
7
Sana Kamal, "Taking No Chances. "Middle East International 12 October 200 I, p . 11.
8
Judith Miller, "Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman," The New York Times
15 January 2001, pp . Al, A7 .
9
See Sana Kamal, "Terror Trials. ·· Middle East International 11 January 2002, pp . 1213.
10
Howard Schneider, "Jordan Anti-Terror Figure Apparent Bomb Target," The Washington Post I March 2002 , p. A 17.
11
Sana Kamal, "Troops to Mazar," Middle East lnlernational 21 December 2001, pp . I 718.
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ing the regime and, combined with continued curbs on public
demonstrations, the measures motivated some to charge that the
government was exploiting the crisis in order to return the country to the days of martial law. 12
Throughout this domestic squeeze, Jordan stood behind US
policy in confronting al-Qaeda; however, it repeatedly expressed
opposition to American plans that involved attacks on Iraq or any
other Arab state. During King Abdullah's September 28 trip to
Washington, D.C., the Jordanian press reported he had extracted
a promise from the Bush administration that it would not target
Iraq or any other Arab country, a pledge that was quickly called
into question by continued statements from Bush officials suggesting America would strike at any state harboring terrorist
elements. 13 Subsequent Jordanian warnings against Iraq were
met with similarly ambiguous US responses. Jordan's concerns
for the US terror fighting strategy were also raised by the deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the repeated Israeli
incursions into territories handed back to the Palestinian Authority. Ever since the events of September 11, King Abdullah has
been quick to echo public sentiment by connecting the attacks on
the US to larger issues in the region, saying during one interview
that "if the United States had resolved the problems in the Middle East, notably the Israeli-Palestinian question, I seriously
doubt that they [September 11 attacks] would have taken
place. " 14 Jordan's push for the US to forcefully engage IsraeliPalestinian diplomacy has only grown with the escalation of vio-

12
Sana Kamal, "Tightening the Screws, " Middle East International 26 October 2001, p.
2 I.
13
Kamal, "Taking No Chances . " Middle East International 12 October 200 I, p . 11.
14
"King: Attacks Add Urgency to Mideast Solution," The Jordan Times 13 October
2001.
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lence between the two and America's reticence to heed Jordan's
counsel has threatened to strain relations .
But in spite of these differences in specific policy directions,
Jordan's official pronouncements do not yet indicate signs of a
breach in the strong strategic bond with the US formed over
fighting terror. Indeed, members of the Jordanian regime emphasize that they understood the dangers posed by terror networks
long before the West and reiterate that the country's resolve to
fight extremism is unwavering. 15 Still, individuals inside and
outside elite Jordanian circles regularly express suspicion over
western motives behind fighting terror and worry whether Jordan's support will eventually result in a widening split between
the Jordanian state and street. 16 In the eyes of some, Jordan is
hanging between dependency on Washington and its own public
opm10n.
JORDAN'S CHANGfNG POSITION IN THE REGION

One path to explaining a country's foreign policy stance is to
assume that states are primarily reacting to forces they confront
in the regional or international system: thus, the nature of external threats or challenges will dictate appropriate responses. 17 For
a relatively weak state like Jordan operating in a dangerous regional and international environment, at least three possible responses exist: balancing, bandwagoning, or onmibalancing.
Balancing and bandwagoning essentially constitute opposite reactions to a perceived threat: either a country allies with others to
offset danger or it aligns with a source of peril in order to mini15
" For Jordan, Ther e Is No Grey Area in Anti -Terrori sm Fight," The Jordan Times I 0
December 200 I .
16
Ian Fisher , "On Streets of Jordan , Doubts Lurk About War ," The New York Times 6
October 200 I, p . 83 .
17
A key argument along these lines can be found in Stephen Walt , The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1987) .
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mize its impact or share in the resulting spoils (Walt 1987, 97).
Omnibalancing is a form of alignment decision that assumes
choices will be made based on an assessment of all threats facing
the regime- external and internal - and will reflect a regime 's
primary desire to survive (David 1991).
When considering Jordan's traditional position in the Middle
East, Jordan has typically been characterized as a strategically
vulnerable moderate Arab state that carefully navigates its way
through inter-Arab politics while the king and his tight cadre of
foreign policy makers typically harbor pro-western sympathies.
Moreover, its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been considered particularly important given its geographic proximity to
Israel and its large Palestinian population, much of which came
to Jordan to escape the ravages of regional conflict. According to
this perspective , although Jordan maintained tacit understandings
with Israel for many years in order to enhance its security, historical Jordanian claims to the West Bank and a need for its policies toward Israel to respond to its Palestinian majority
necessitated that the country resist converting this relationship
into a formal peace arrangement for fear of suffering a backlash
from other Arab states (Ryan 1998). This fear was reinforced
after Jordan's leaders watched Egypt endure isolation in response
to concluding its own separate peace with Israel. Beginning in
the mid-1980s, however, King Hussein undertook to reposition
Jordan in the region, an effort that culminated in the country's
renunciation of claims to the West Bank late in the decade . Strategically, this move ended any possibilities of the King negotiating on behalf of Palestinians and simplified the prospects for
concluding an agreement with Israel by diminishing Jordan's
part in the process to settling matters of sovereignty along the
east bank of the Jordan River. Following this shift, Jordan was
integral in creating the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), an
alignment of Egypt, Iraq, North Yemen, and Jordan to primarily
VOL.
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promote inter-Arab economic cooperation. The emergence of
this organization further clarified Jordan's evolving strategic role
as a state pushing regional economic integration and a new
pathway for the future of the Middle East. Though the ACC had
little in the way of an explicit military component, Jordan's alliance with Iraq and Egypt also allowed it to associate with two
key powers that provided a degree of balance against its chief
regional security concerns at the time, Israel and Syria. 18
This alignment was soon shaken, however, by Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Although Jordan shared little ideologically
with Baghdad's ruling establishment and condemned Iraq's
breach of Kuwaiti sovereignty, because the country's political
and economic ties to Iraq had grown significantly since the mid1970 's the King and others considered the relationship to be vital
(Baram 1991). Essentially, Iraq's occupation of Kuwait had
trapped Jordan between the countervailing threats of Israel and
Iraq, with both powers occupying Arab land. As a result, Jordan's initial response sought to promote an Arab solution to the
Iraqi crisis that attempted to build links between it and the ongoing Israeli seizure of Palestinian lands while pointing to the contradictions inherent in rapid western mobilization against Iraq
and years of quiescence in the face of Israeli occupation (Lesch
1991). With this stance, Jordan quickly found itself caught in
another strategic bind, at odds with fellow ACC member Egypt
as well as America's anti-Iraq coalition building. Soon it was
forced to choose between once compatible associations. Strategically, the stronger case for alignment seemingly rested with joining the anti-Iraq coalition, particularly given Jordan's historically
pro-western orientation and the offers of enhanced aid extended
by Saudi Arabia and others. In the end, however, when King
11
For more on this alignment, see Curtis Ryan ( 1998) "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of
the Arab Cooperation Council ," Middle East Journal 52 (3): 386-401 .
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Hussein's efforts at mediating the crisis failed, he bowed to
Arabist pressures and pursued a course consistent with omnibalancing, choosing not to abandon Iraq and thereby endure political ostracism from the US and Jordan's former Gulf Arab allies.
Although Jordan was siding with the weaker party strategically,
its moves followed logically from its commitment to finding a
regional solution. The choice also reflected popular pro-Iraqi
sentiments being expressed within Jordan, especially among
elements of the country's security and military ranks that provided critical support for the monarchy, as well as within Palestinian segments of society that had long been an internal security
concern (Garnham 1991, 74).
The political isolation Jordan experienced for its decision was
great in the short term and soon after the Gulf War ended, the
country 's leaders strived to regain Jordan's standing within the
region while attempting to reclaim its prior measure of universal
international acceptance. The country quickly rehabilitated itself
strategically with the US and the West by breaking with a weakened Iraq and eventually welcomed Iraqi dissidents to Amman.
Moreover, after Israel and the Palestinians cleared the way for
peace politically by completing the Oslo Accord, Jordan concluded its own treaty with Israel in the hopes of reaping economic and political rewards. However, as peace with Israel failed
to realize its early potential and concerns about Jordan's alienation in the Arab world grew, its leaders moved to restore relations with the Gulf states and gradually even began to play a
subtle leading role in Arab reconciliation with Iraq . 19 At the same
time, mounting worries over the security ramifications of growing Israeli-Palestinian tensions prompted the Jordanian government to launch a crackdown on Hamas officials in Jordan . As the
19

See Sana Kamal, "M~nding Fences." Middle Enst lnternntionn/ 28 July 2000, pp. 1415.
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second Palestinian intifada that began in September 2000 grew
in intensity, Jordan's regional and international efforts to diffuse
Israeli-Palestinian tensions escalated in order to prevent Palestinian frustration from destabilizing Jordan's always delicate demographic balance. 20
In light of these efforts, Jordan's stance to align with the US
against terror could be viewed as a logical extension of a form of
bandwagoning that has marked the country's foreign policy since
the end of the Gulf War and that is largely consistent with the
country's tendencies historically. Regionally, Jordan finds itself
solidifying its ties today with powers like Saudi Arabia that are
directly challenged by al-Qaeda and internationally it is positioning itself to stand behind US political and military muscle.
Moreover, if the King was in fact a target of al-Qaeda and many
of the country's tourist destinations were labeled for attack, Jordan's recent alignments could further be regarded as an effort to
counter a significant threat to the security of both the regime and
the country. At the same time, Jordan's work to convince its
American ally to forgo operations against Iraq and instead devote
its terror-fighting energies to engaging the Palestinian issue more
directly and diplomatically could be viewed as attempting to
head off more immediate security concerns. What Jordan fears
from a move against Iraq is the possibility that Iraq could again
attack Israel and engulf much of the country's perimeter in conflict. Meanwhile, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence always
contains the potential to create a spillover effect in Jordan, with
worry of a massive, forced Palestinian population transfer part of
a worst case scenario. 21
20

See Sana Kamal, "Hamas : Has Jordan Gone Too Far?" Middle Enst Jnternntionnl 26
November 1999, pp . 3,6; Sana Kamal, "Intifada Jitters," Middle Ens/ l11ternnlionnl 22
December 2000, pp. 9-10 .
21
See for example comments by the current Prime Minister of Jordan in "PM Says Palestinians Should Prove Ability to Establish State," The Jordan Times I July 2002 .
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It is also clear that associating categorically with the US war
on terror carries significant strategic risks for Jordan as revealed
by the omnibalancing concept. For one, the move has exposed
Jordan openly as an ally of the US at a particularly sensitive
moment. In the current regional and global climate, a closer relationship with the US invites more attention from terrorist elements that seek to illustrate the moral banlauptcy of prevailing
Arab regimes and simultaneously damage US interests. More
critically, however, a strong Jordanian connection with the US
complicates the regime's efforts to maintain a credible Arabist
posture and assure security domestically. In the past, Arab suspicions of Jordanian motives have escalated when it sides with the
West and Jordan's leaders have often been sensitive to critiques
that charged too close an alignment with the West at the expense
of its place in the Arab world. A recent example of this dynamic
came in 1997 during Jordan's participation as an observer in
Turkish-Israeli military maneuvers which drew the ire of many
in the region. Similar criticisms have been leveled by Egypt and
Saudi Arabia over Jordan's willingness to contribute forces to the
US campaign in Afghanistan. 22 Moreover, US policies that target
Iraq and favor Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians are
widely unpopular within Jordanian society and in the Arab world
more broadly and they have provoked strong public reactions
inside Jordan, reactions the regime has sought in term to limit. 23
When viewed through this prism, Jordan's response to the war
on terror is courting domestic, regional and possibly now
international security threats that a decade earlier the country
explicitly chose to avoid confronting.

22
Kam Sana Kamal, "Troops to Mazar," Middle East International 21 December 2001,
pp. 17-18.
23
See Marc Lynch, "Jordan's King Abdullah in Washington," MERIP Press Information
Note 94, 8 May 2002, http://www.merip.org /pins/pin94.htm1.
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DOMESTIC POLITrCS AND ECONOMIC STABILITY

Though aspects of omnibalancing do attempt to incorporate
domestic interests, for the most part the previous account relies
on the behavior of other actors in the system to explain the foreign policy orientation of a state . However, a second set of explanatory variables revolves specifically around domestic
factors . In general , this perspective seeks to incorporate the ongoing processes of identity construction in a state, the dynamics
of intra-state coalitions and civil society, and the pressures of
economic interdependence and state driven economic development into calculations of the security dilemmas faced by a state
(Lawson 1993). As changes in these areas occur domestically ,
they alter a regime 's calculation of threats and the salience of the
security dilemma a state confronts (Lawson 1993, 123).
Since I 989, Jordan's monarchical system has been changing.
Beginning in 1986, King Hussein reconvened Parliament that
had been dismissed almost two decades earlier and in 1989, he
sanctioned new elections after painful economic reforms sparked
riots and social unrest in cities traditionally loyal to the monarchy. The results of these elections saw Islamists win almost as
many of the 80 seats contested as regime loyalists and created
the prospects for more contentious politics within the country.
However, Jordan's strategic break with the anti-Iraq coalition
clearly had the impact of unifying contending domestic constituencies. Jordanians from across the political spectrum sympathized with the Iraqi position against what was regarded as an
arrogant Kuwaiti regime that had exploited inexpensive Jordanian labor for years. Despite the added economic hardships
borne by Jordan 's choice to favor Iraq in the conflict , King Hussein 's decision ultimately opened the door for Islamic participation in the government and solidified the regime 's standing at
home .
T I-IE J OU RNA L OF P OLI TI CAL SCIENCE
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As time progressed in Jordan, however, the path of political
and economic liberalization embarked upon by the regime became more controversial domestically. Changes in Jordan's electoral law that replaced a multiple vote system with a "one
person-one vote" scheme severely and purposefully cut into Islamic representation after the 1993 elections and eventually resulted in many Islamist parties boycotting parliamentary
elections in 1997. Jordan's peace treaty with Israel in 1994 came
as a shock to many in the country and quickly gave rise to a
popular movement against normalization of relations with Israel.
The strength of this movement together with other changes underway in Jordanian civil society prompted the state to place significant controls on organized groups, including strict limits on
the capacity of sanctioned organizations to engage in explicit
political behavior (Wiktorowicz 1998). All this has constrained
domestic political debate and contributed to a significant drop in
the Jordanian public's faith in democratic politics while provoking scholars to coin phrases like "fa9ade democracy" to describe
what the country is practicing. 24 In economic terms too, Jordan
continued to struggle throughout the 1990s with low growth
rates, high unemployment, and strict limits on economic help
from the government in order to remain compliant with International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment requirements.
Periodic social unrest arose in key areas of traditional regime
support, particularly in reaction to state cutbacks on subsidies or
other measures connected to complying with international economic agreements. Corruption remained a problem in the economy as well and government credibility on economic matters

24
"Jordanian Democratization Process Bad, But Better Than Elsewhere-C SS Poll," 171e
Jordan Times 26 Septen,ber 2001; Quintan Wiktorowicz (1999) "The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan," The Middle East Journal 53 (4): 606-620 .
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Palestinians who have been left to find their way in the now favored private sector.
At another level too, some scholars of Jordanian politics have
noted an identity change underway within the Kingdom, leading
to a new level of contestation within Jordan's "public sphere. " 26
After long responding to pressures inherent in the country's prevailing Arabist identity, more recently a "nationalizing project"
pushed by the country's leadership has encouraged Jordan to become more state-centric and transformed its policy preferences.
Whereas Jordan once had been motivated to frame its foreign
policy so that it would maintain an accepted place within an
Arab consensus, gradually the regime now calculates interests at
an inherently state level while regionally emphasizing the aspects of its foreign policy that can modernize and transform the
position of the Arab region in a globalizing world. Although
many domestic constituencies quietly supp011 the changes underway, the new outlook still has influential opponents, especially among Arab nationalist, Palestinian and selected Islamic
quarters. The extent to which the state limits or represses public
expressions of this opposition indicates a failure on its part to
persuade these and other constituencies and potentially signals
the continued presence of doubts over Jordan's course within
portions of the state itself.
Given these prevailing domestic conditions, one can see some
limited potential advantages to a Jordan aligned strongly against
terror and with the US At the international level, Jordan is again
being held up as a model of moderation by the US and such external political support can help the regime promote the advantages inherent in its commitment to change with its domestic
26

One important proponent of this argument is Marc Lynch. See Marc Lynch, "Jordan's
Identity and Interests ," in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, eds. Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 2002), pp . 26-57 .
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was badly damaged recently by exaggerated claims of growth
and prosperity that were exposed by external observers.
What has emerged throughout this time is a gradual divergence of state interests with public opinion in the country. While
the regime seeks to contain domestic frustration with economic
hardships and maintain control over political processes through
the manipulation of electoral laws and timing of elections, Jordanians themselves continue to seek greater and more meaningful avenues of political expression and influence. Periodic
demonstrations, either protesting unpopular governmental policies or supporting causes the government is not endorsing, have
become more prevalent and have motivated the regime to place
more significant restrictions on public gatherings. Despite such
limits, demonstrations are nonetheless occasionally organized
and sometimes provoke harsh governmental reactions. Other
recent examples of unsanctioned political behavior include
grassroots publication of a "blacklist" of Jordanian enterprises
that do business with Israel and an attempt to organize a popular
boycott of US products sold in Jordan in light of US attacks on
Afghanistan. The severity of this breach between the public and
the state has grown more acute since King Abdullah assumed the
throne in 1999. Although the new monarch initially ingratiated
himself publicly with surprise royal visits calling attention to
underperforming state enterprises in the name of reform, increasingly attention has shifted to his difficulty in conciliating divergent factions in the country and promoting a successful socioeconomic plan furthering development. 25 Of particular note here
too are rising tensions between East Bank Jordanians who have
traditionally controlled the public sector of the economy and
25

Douglas Jehl, "The King and the 'Cabby' Inspect Jordan Incognito," The New York
Times 9 August 1999, p. A I, A9; Neil MacFarquhar , "Hopes for Change in Jordan Are
Beginning to Fade," The New York Times 9 April 2001, p. 3.
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allies .27 In a practical sense too, since the events of September 11
have been devastating to many vital developing industries in the
country like tourism, siding with the US held out the prospects
for domestic economic relief. Jordan 's strategic choice was
clearly influential in speeding a finalized and quickly implemented free trade agreement with the US, which Jordan has
trumpeted as an accomplishment that will help enhance the quality of life for many Jordanians. However, these benefits remain
tied to the external arena and in any event do not appear to outweigh the advantages Jordan would accrue domestically had it
adopted a more ambiguous position or kept more diplomatic distance between itself and America. It has become increasingly
clear in recent times that processes of political liberalization in
Jordan have been intentionally slowed- to some, the primary
aim of the country 's "democratization" was always to further
entrench traditional pillars of power in their positions while
nominally bowing to the forces of political challenge (Robinson
1998). Although frustration with the slow pace of political reforms is not widely evident due to stifled channels of political
expression , Jordan 's choice to ally closely with the US adds salient areas of difference between the regime and much of the public over approaches to the condition of the Palestinians and the
future of Iraq that today find little political space for airing.
Moreover, whenever some Israeli-Palestinian political accommodation is reached, Jordan faces a potentially wrenching domestic process of compelling Palestinians to choose between
being Palestinian (and perhaps having political rights in Jordan
permanently curbed) or being Jordanian (and thereby relinquishing claims to political activity in a future Palestinian state).
Should such a moment arise, the level of legitimacy enjoyed by
27

Eric Schm itt, "Official Seeks Aid for States Where Islam is Moderate, " The New York
Times 2 June 2002 , p. 4.

T HE J OU RNA L OF PO LI T ICAL SCIE N CE

107

BETWEEN ROCKS AND HARD PLACES

the Jordanian regime will be critical. Combining this impending
challenge with the persistent hardships many Jordanians continue to experience from a slow-growing economy further exposes political gaps between state and society. Although few
regard the Jordanian monarchy as under any direct or fundamental challenge today, its long term future is never assured given
the future it faces. By siding with the US, the regime has taken
additional steps to underscore several areas of contention that
have divided the government from its people over the last several
years .
POLITICALECONOMYAND BUDGET SECURJTY

Whereas a political economy and budgetary security framework shares ground with the previous perspective in that it considers domestic threats as relevant to explaining a nation's
alignment decisions, it diverges by assuming specifically that a
regime's estimates of its own economic needs and weaknesses
can shape foreign policy decisions, especially regarding alliances
(Brand 1994). The key priority emphasized here is the need for
the regime to promote and protect state solvency and sources of
state revenue (including trade, aid, remittances, and customs duties) in order to ·ensure the health of the domestic economy. The
presumption is that a state will align with one or more actors
primarily to prevent economic crises or otherwise enhance its
economic stability (Brand 2001).
There is little doubt that in the past twenty years, Jordan's political economy has been a central challenge for the regime.
While long a poor country with few natural resources in a
wealthy region, by the 1970s Jordan had become dependent for
much of its annual revenue on external aid from its Arab
neighbors and remittances from large segments of its labor force
employed elsewhere. Moreover, the state was primarily supporting the domestic economy by serving as primary employer, funVOL. 30 2002
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der for development and social welfare projects , and subsidizer
of many basic life staples (Brynen 1992). Between 1981 and
1987, a slumping oil market drove Jordan 's revenue base down
dramatically and plunged the country into economic crisis. Typical of develop ing countries under such stress , the state borrowed
heavily to finance its growing budget deficit rather than cut expenditures and risk domestic discontent. Soon, Jordan had exhausted its own reserves and could no longer finance its $8.4
billion debt (Reed 1990). When the government sought IMF help
to reschedule its debt in the spring 1989, the terms exacted for
such aid included cuts in consumer subsidies, price increases and
other painful economic reforms , all of which quickly led to domestic unrest in key areas of traditional support for the monarchy
and compelled King Hussein to begin opening up the political
system (Rath 2001 ). Gradually too, the era of Jordan relying
primarily on external sources of income support was ending
(Brand 2001) The country 's transition from a rentier economy to
an economy based on domestic production for export required
new external alliances and by the 1980s, these needs were already beginning to influence Jordan's alignment choices, including revised relationships with Syria, Iraq and Egypt (Brand 2001,
145-150) .
The outbreak of regional crises with Iraq 's invasion of Kuwait placed a series of undesirable economic choices before Jordanian foreign policy makers and again from this perspective
seemed to auger for allying the country with the coalition confronting Iraq. After all, Jordan had long been dependent upon
Gulf aid and economic markets, with Saudi Arabia in particular
standing as its second largest trading partner and most reliable
source of assistance and subsidized oil. The Saudis made clear to
Jordan that they would reward or punish depending on the choice
it made (Brand 1991). On the other hand , Iraq was Jordan's largest trading partner, a source of inexpensive oil, and an important
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client in the Jordanian port of Aqaba, where many Iraqi imports
and exports were transshipped away over the past eight years
from the dangers in the Persian Gulf War with Iran. Walking
away from Iraq meant leaving behind a key source of energy and
potentially losing access to Iraqi markets even beyond the terms
of any sanctions regime directed against Baghdad. Though an
economic explanation alone does not fully account for why Jordan chose to side with Iraq and incur huge short-term costs, it
does emphasize the limited maneuverability Jordan possessed
economically at the time of the crisis (Brand 1999). More significantly, while Jordan's decision to side with Iraq in the wake
of the crisis cost it Gulf and American aid as revenue sources, it
became a major beneficiary of cheap Iraqi oil and allowed the
King to mollify key constituencies that national revenues continued to support, including the country's military and security
forces. At the same time, the move ultimately interrupted economic restructuring and thereby delayed the additional pain and
dislocation associated with long-term changes.
Since the second Gulf War, Jordan has walked a tighter line
on economic reform than on political liberalization. After regaining American aid in the wake of its break with Iraq, the government implemented a second phase of economic adjustment
policies in conjunction with the IMF, which included eliminating
bread subsidies and again provoked rioting in southern Jordanian
towns like Kerak and Maan. Unlike what prevailed in the previous round of economic reforms, however, Jordan's macroeconomic conditions were showing temporary signs of improvement
and the government had learned how to manage the political liberalization process more to its liking. The result was it did not
respond to additional social unrest with more political openness
but rather with a crackdown on demonstrations and threats of an
"iron-fist" to restore order (Ryan 1998). Jordan's move to strike
a peace deal with Israel was motivated partly by economic conVOL. 30 2002
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siderations as well. Peace with Israel not only held the prospects
for opening Israeli markets (as opposed to Iraqi markets) and
expanding domestic industries like tourism but it meant the possibility of courting more sustained US and western assistance,
including most critically debt rescheduling and relief. However,
clearly Jordan has not been able to reap all the economic advantages it sought from its accord with Israel and this has in turn
more recently fueled the country's tentative initiatives that promote Arab reconciliation with Iraq, a stance popular with portions of Jordan's increasingly important private economic sector.
Push for economic change has been further accelerated by
King Abdullah's accession to the throne and his priority to promote national economic development by making Jordan a regional trade center and modernizing the country for entry into
the globalizing world economy. Not only has Jordan attained
membership in the World Trade Organization and been active in
regional economic conferences but it also began establishing
Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), where products are jointly
manufactured by Israeli and Jordanian firms and enter US markets duty-free , and created the Aqaba Special Economic Zone
(ASEZ) to enhance the production and flow of Jordanian exports
and attract foreign capital into the country. Efforts to privatize
state firms expanded markedly and the government sought to
generate more revenues domestically by raising sales taxes and
continuing to cut government subsidies (Andoni 2000) . In addition, the King sought to entice information technology industries
like Microsoft to develop Jordan's future infrastructure (Cunningham 2002).
Despite the continued emphasis on economic transformation
underway, questions remain about who benefits from this activity. Many of the costs associated with the early phases of privatization and economic restructuring were clearly felt most readily
by the middle and lower classes in Jordan. It is estimated today
T HE J OU RNAL OF PO LITI CAL SCIE N CE

BETWEEN ROCKS AND HARD PLACES

111

that upwards of one-third of the population still lives below the
poverty line. 28 Moreover, the pace of economic transformation
has been a touchstone of resistance among many entrenched
groups in the country which have spawned grassroots opposition
to normalization with Israel and questioned the wisdom of immersing a tribal society in the global market. Though critics of
Abdullah's direction themselves remain badly divided, the clash
between "modernizers" and "traditionalists" has nonetheless
been a noticeable factor in the survival and demise of successive
governments recently within Jordan. When outgoing Prime Minister Abdul Raouf Rawabda was relieved of his post in favor of
Ali Abu Ragheb in 2000, the key charge given the new government was to implement another round of socio-economic reform
that the previous government had failed to enact.
Given the economic priorities now being pursued by Abdullah and the tangible needs that accompany it, the King seemingly
concluded that continued support of the West and especially the
US was essential. Although Jordan's primary creditors today are
Japan and European nations, enthusiastic US backing provides
the regime with leverage in attempting to win the debt relief and
competition for new foreign direct investment that the country
seeks. Jordan quickly profited by its support of America's war on
terror when the Bush administration prodded final congressional
approval and expedited implementation of the Jordan-US free
trade agreement, with Bush underscoring that countries supporting peace and economic reform stood to gain "concrete benefits. " 29 A doubling of US foreign aid to $450 million has also
been proposed. While Jordan has made strides to increase oppor-

28

"Current Poverty Strategies Might Take Years to Bear Fruit," The Jordan Times 14
December 200 I .
29
Richard Stevenson, "Senate Approves Bill to Lift Barriers to Trade With Jordan," The
New York_Timel?25 September 200 I, pp. Cl, C6.
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tunities for basic education and access to health care, pressures
to· provide jobs with higher living standards to a society where
half of its five million people are under age 20 remains a central
economic challenge. Economists estimate that Jordan's economy
must create more than 50,000 new jobs annually to absorb workers entering the market and begin lowering the country's stubbornly high unemployment rate and it must grow at six percent
or more annually in order to lift per capita_ incomes above
$1,700. 3°Corruption and the practice of wasta (connections) also
remain critical obstacles the country must overcome. Although
recent surveys indicate that more substantial portions of the Jordanian population support aspects of economic restructuring,
their endorsements are clearly driven by a conception of change
that promotes new job creation, better goods and lower prices.31
In a country with scarce resources and chronic water shortages
but desiring to promote domestic production over external
sources of revenue, sustained and dependable sources of outside
help and access to markets remain critical if Jordan's economic
goals are to be realized. Add to this equation a fear of regional
violence and terrorism that brings with it an accompanying drop
in tourism, foreign investment and exports and the motivations
behind Jordan's choice to side openly with the West become
clearer still.
IMPLICATIONS

Though it would be an overstatement to conclude that economic and budgetary factors were the sole elements driving Jordanian foreign policy and specifically its recent decision to ally
30
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so strongly with the US against terror, increasingly it appears
that any explanation is markedly incomplete without these considerations. Not only has economic development become a key
priority of King Abdullah's agenda but Jordan is also unquestionably engaged in an attempt to move its economic base toward more domestic production and into the global market
instead of relying so heavily on external rents and statecontrolled enterprises. This shift is both economically ambitious
and politically sensitive: for years, Palestinians have dominated
the weak private sector while East Bank Jordanians have controlled state-owned entities. Changes in economic emphasis inevitably now mean struggles to retain political power and the
potential for changes in who wields power. Early signs of this
came as King Abdullah sought to strengthen his own hold on the
throne . His creation of a new Economic Consultative Council
(ECC) to provide advice on economic policy includes many of
the country's young economic elite and is accountable only to
the King. Increasingly, the ECC's power is seen as exceeding
that of the formal government (there is now overlap between the
ECC and the Abu Ragheb cabinet) and while its mandate is focused on the economy, its range of influence now extends deep
into all realms of the country's affairs. The "economization" of a
new elite hand picked by the King and serving at his discretion
may be underway (Schlumberger and Bank 2001-2002). 32 For
Jordan to manage such complex and delicate processes with any
prospects of success, its leadership has seemingly concluded that
support from the West and particularly the US is critical and can
be assured only if Jordan's policies are geared to court it. In a

n As a further example of this point, Jordan's newly appointed ambassador to the US,
Karim Kawar , is an IT entrepreneur and friend of Abdullah whose only prior political
experience was sitting on the ECC. His appointment makes the first time the post has
been assigned to someone with primarily business as opposed to political experience .
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climate punctuated by terror, Jordan 's aims are imperiled and the
country itself need not be a target for many of the damaging effects to be felt. Political violence directed at the US that carries
with it a critique of Arab regimes it supports as illegitimate, corrupt , and directly responsible for the many impoverished in the
region poses a threat to Jordan at many different levels.
But because policy is not made on the basis of a single set of
factors, when one looks further into Jordan's situation , real dilemmas emerge. Close relations with a US government that is
staunchly supportive of Israel's fight against the Palestinians and
determined to bring about regime change in Iraq inevitably associates Jordan with these initiatives, especially in the minds of a
public that largely disapproves of American means if not its
goals altogether. Even granting that an identity shift may be underway within both leadership and public that motivates inore
Jordanians to evaluate the Palestinian and Iraqi issues from statecentric as opposed to Arabist perspectives, the monarchy must
still weigh the domestic reactions to America's hegemonic meddling in these cases with care . Jordan 's leaders ultimately have
little capacity to influence the American foreign policymaking
process and assuredly , hostility to American moves in the region
will be directed eventually at the Jordanian government that has
failed to stand with the population. In the past, this dynamic has
led the regime to suppress domestic expression and further jeopardize political liberalization; indeed , Jordan 's processes of political liberalization have long been tied to foreign policy
developments in these issue areas (Brand 1999). Recent decisions by King Abdullah to postpone parliamentary elections and
endorse a revised electoral law that does little to address domestic concerns are disquieting developments in themselves, but
they also signal continuity with past trends . Only if the region is
relatively quiet (and the regime can satisfy itself that an Islamist
opposition will not prevail) may legislative elections be held in
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2002. Moreover, according to the regime's explanations for the
continuity in the electoral arrangements, only when the Palestinian issue is resolved might Jordan's system of political represen33
tation begin to reflect popular will. Add to these recent setbacks
the continued tough press restrictions and high profile trials of
critics like Toujan Faisal who speak out against the government
and the climate for political openness in Jordan is further
chilled .34 While al-Qaeda's ideology does not suggest a democratic alternative, the continuing repressive, dynastic and patrimonial tendencies of a Jordanian regime pursuing unpopular
foreign policies gives voice to some of its claims. More directly,
Jordan's search for economic stability and budget security is further undermining efforts at democratization that both Jordanian
and American leaders rhetorically support and that much of the
population clearly desires.
In the end, Jordan is unlike many other Arab states in that it
does not face a direct Islamic "threat"-relations
between the
monarchy and its Islamist critics, while often tense, have never
yet tended toward political extremism. 35 Nor does the Jordanian
regime today face any imminent danger from Palestinian nationalists, as it once feared in the early days of the PLO. Indeed, prevailing assessments of Abdullah 's position indicate he has
stabilized himself as monarch and is not directly threatened
36
unless domestic or regional conditions change dramatically.
But Jordan is like many of its regional neighbors in that it con33
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fronts a longer-term future in which large numbers of its young
citizens will seek political opportunities and higher standards of
living while continuing to shape an identity for themselves and
their communities that is bounded by historical and cultural traditions. As they pursue these aims, they will inevitably want and
expect the country's leaders to facilitate these activities economically and not hinder them politically. 37 Recent upsurges in
regional tensions that have helped significantly alter the course
and pace of democratic change in Jordan and elsewhere in the
region have sounded alarms about the future ramifications of
such developments. 38 Moreover, the goals of people in Jordan
and elsewhere in the Arab world will be shaped in an external
environment led for the foreseeable future by US power that
some regard as stronger and more widely influential than any
hegemony the world has ever known (Wohlford 1994). Jordan is
risking a great deal politically and hoping for a great deal
economically in exchange for accommodating American
priorities in the region. But because it is powerless to influence
the directions of US policy, its choices may yet force the country
to accede to ever-greater American demands for support against
Iraq or compliance in the face of American-endorsed Israeli
moves against the Palestinians. 39 Thus far, Jordan's leadership
typically responds publicly only to what it can support of
America's initiatives in these arenas and tries to ignore all that
creates policy dilemmas. Before long, however, Jordan may be
37

For an interesting account of such issues in a Saudi context, see Mai Yamani, Changed
Identities : The Challenge of a New Generation in Saudi Arabia (London: The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2000).
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dilemmas. Before long, however, Jordan may be forced to
choose sides again and it is not a certainty it would (or could)
side with its population when the moment arises this time. Terrorism and the responses of nations to it are themselves part of
this larger dynamic, though they may not always be seen in this
light. Jordan's reactions to the perils posed by al-Qaeda have less
to do with immediate security concerns than with long-term strategic ad economic calculations. How small, relatively vulnerable
Arab countries like Jordan now respond to the dilemmas posed
by these dynamics will certainly affect the long-term prospects
of the country, the region, and perhaps America's place in the
world as well.
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